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Abstract 
 
Recently, Busemeyer et al. (2011) presented a model for how the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983) emerges, based on the principles of quantum probability (QP) theory. Pothos et al. 
(2013) extended this model to account for the main similarity findings of Tversky (1977), which have 
served as a golden standard for testing novel theories of similarity. Hoǁeǀeƌ, TǀeƌskǇ͛s ;ϭϵϳϳͿ empirical 
findings did not address the now established insight that, in comparing two objects, overlap in matching 
parts of the objects tends to have a greater impact on their similarity, than overlap in non-matching 
parts. We show how the QP similarity model can be directly extended to accommodate structure in 
siŵilaƌitǇ ĐoŵpaƌisoŶs. “ŵoleŶskǇ͛s et al.͛s ;iŶ pƌessͿ pƌoposal for modeling structure in linguistic 
ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs, ǁith teŶsoƌ pƌoduĐts, ĐaŶ ďe adapted ͚as is͛ ǁith the QP siŵilaƌitǇ ŵodel. The foƌŵal 
properties of the extended QP similarity model are analyzed, some indicative fits are presented, and, 
finally, a novel prediction is developed.  
 
keywords: quantum probability theory, similarity, representation 
 
Highlights:  
 
*We consider a model of basic similarity judgments, based on quantum probability principles.  
 
*We augment this model with Smolensky et al. (in press) ideas for structure in representations. 
 
*We show that this proposal can accommodate the main insights regarding structure in similarity 
judgments.  
 
*We consider the formal properties of our model and discuss the placement of this work in the 
similarity, analogy literature.  
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1. Introduction 
 
We call quantum probability (QP) theory the rules for assigning probability to events, without any of the 
physics (Hughes, 1989, Isham, 1989). QP theory is a framework for probabilistic inference alternative to 
that of classical probability (CP) theory. A case for adopting QP theory, instead of classical probability 
(CP) theory, in cognitive modeling has been made when human behavior appears at odds with the 
prescription from CP theory (e.g., Aerts, 2009; Aerts & Gabora, 1995; Blutner et al., 2013; Nelson et al., 
in press; for overviews see Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Haven & Khrennikov, 2013; Khrennikov, 2010; 
Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013; Wang et al., 2013; Yearsley & Pothos, 2014). Recently, Busemeyer et al. 
(2011) presented a model of decision making, based on QP principles, with an emphasis on how the 
conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), and related findings, emerge. For example, in the 
conjunction fallacy experiment, participants were told of a hypothetical person, Linda, described very 
much as a feminist (F) and not at all as a bank teller (BT). Participant responses indicated that     ሺ    ሻ      ሺ  ሻ, which is impossible classically. In BuseŵeǇeƌ at el.͛s ;ϮϬϭϭͿ QP ŵodel foƌ 
this conjunction fallacy, if one assumes that the BT, F possibilities are incompatible, then it can emerge 
that the quantum probability of           is higher than that of  .  
Pothos, Busemeyer, and Trueblood (2013) considered whether the QP decision model could be 
extended to account for basic similarity judgments. Their motivation was that QP theory is formalized in 
multidimensional, vector spaces, called Hilbert spaces. The most common, standard way to model basic 
similarity involves multidimensional representations (e.g., Shepard, 1987) and the conceptualization of 
similarity as a function of distance. For example, such models have been employed in the predominant 
approaches to categorization (e.g., Goldstone, 1994a; Nosofsky, 1984; Wills & Pothos, 2012). Therefore, 
since QP representations are also geometric (that is, involve elements in some multidimensional vector 
space), perhaps QP theory can provide some interesting generalization to the standard distance-based 
similarity models?  
Note first that, by basic similarity judgments, we imply ones that are nonanalytic (in the 
psychological sense), direct, and immediate. If we accept the view that basic similarity judgments can be 
modeled as some function of distance, then they have to be consistent with the metric axioms – 
mathematical requirements that all (simple) functions of distances need to obey. These axioms are 
intuitively appealing. For example, the symmetry axiom, requires that         ሺ   ሻ          ሺ   ሻ, implying that           ሺ   ሻ            ሺ   ሻ. In one of the 
most influential studies in the basic similarity literature, Tversky (1977) showed that all metric axioms 
ĐaŶ ďe ǀiolated iŶ siŵilaƌitǇ judgŵeŶts of Ŷaïǀe oďseƌǀeƌs. TǀeƌskǇ͛s ;ϭϵϳϳͿ fiŶdiŶgs haǀe ďeĐoŵe a 
golden standard of empirical results that should be accounted for by any basic similarity model and, 
indeed, have been the focus of theoretical effort in related research ever since (e.g., Ashby & Perrin, 
1988; Krumhansl, 1978). It is worth noting that basic, distance-based similarity metrics can be made to 
violate the metric axioms. For example, symmetry can be violated if           ሺ   ሻ              ሺ   ሻ, where     is just a directionality parameter, that is a parameter which can have a 
different value depending on whether the similarity evaluated is between A and B or between B and A 
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(Nosofsky, 1991). However, the real ĐhalleŶge has ďeeŶ to eǆploƌe hoǁ ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ ǁith TǀeƌskǇ͛s 
(1977) findings can emerge from the structure of a basic similarity model. 
Pothos et al. (2013) showed how the QP deĐisioŶ ŵodel ĐaŶ iŶdeed aĐĐoŵŵodate TǀeƌskǇ͛s 
(1977) key findings, with fairly minor modifications. The objects to be compared in a similarity judgment 
are represented as subspaces, whose dimensionality depends on the extent of knowledge we have 
about the objects. Then, similarity judgments are modeled just as conjunctive probabilities of thinking of 
the first compared object and then the second (one also needs to assume a relevant mental state, that is 
neutral between the compared objects), that is,    ሺ   ሻ      ሺ       ሻ (see also Section 2). 
Foƌ eǆaŵple, TǀeƌskǇ͛s ;ϭϵϳϳͿ faŵous eǆaŵple of ǀiolatioŶs of sǇŵŵetƌǇ iŶ siŵilaƌitǇ judgŵeŶts ǁas the 
finding that    ሺ           ሻ     ሺ           ሻ, given that participants have more extensive 
knowledge for China, than Korea (note, actually Red China and North Korea). In the QP model similarity 
model, this asymmetry can emerge, as long as the dimensionality for the China subspace is greater than 
that for the Korea subspace.  
The application of the QP decision model onto similarity indicates that the formalism can 
encompass findings from both decision making and basic similarity. Clearly, such a statement needs to 
be qualified, since the decision QP model addresses only certain kinds of decision making results and, 
likewise, the similarity one, only certain kinds of basic similarity results. Nevertheless, Pothos et al.͛s 
theory (2013) is encouraging and fits with an overall prerogative to explain as wide a range of empirical 
findings as possible, with as few explanatory principles as possible. For example, supporting the same 
QP model in both decision making and basic similarity makes it plausible that the same principles 
underlie both kinds of cognitive processes.  
While our focus until now has been on basic similarly, a somewhat more recent line of work 
concerns analogical similarity, which partly concerns the study of analogy formation. Simplifying, 
analogy formation is about how a naïve observer can establish associations between the elements of 
two representations (e.g., the atom and the solar system).A key focus for models of analogical similarity 
has been the correspondence between the constituent elements of two compared objects; how do they 
develop and what is their role in the overall similarity judgment, between the compared objects 
(Gentner, 1983; Goldstone, 1994b; Goldstone & Son, 2005; Larkey & Markman, 2005; Taylor & Hummel, 
2009)? For example, suppose we are comparing two persons, Sue and Linda, with black hair. Surely, this 
fact would contribute more to the overall similarity judgment between Sue and Linda, compared to an 
alternative situation, where Sue has black hair and Linda has black shoes. That is, there is intuition and 
supporting evidence that human similarity judgments are sensitive to the structure of the compared 
objects. An influential idea in modeling structure in similarity judgments is that feature matches can be 
aligned or not aligned (Goldstone, 1994b; cf. Markman & Gentner, 1993). That is, parts of one object can 
be placed in correspondence with the parts of another or not. The implication is that matching aligned 
parts have a greater impact on similarity judgments than matching unaligned parts, but the latter can 
increase similarity too. 
We note that the distinction we make between basic and analogical similarity is partly one of 
convenience, as it allows us to easily refer to models of similarity not emphasizing structure (e.g., Ashby 
& Perrin, 1988; Krumhansl, 1978) and ones that do (Gentner, 1983; Goldstone, 1994b). Cognitively, it is 
possible that there are differences between judgments of basic similarity and analogy formation (e.g., 
the latter have been claimed to be sometimes analytic, Casale et al., 2012), but these issues do not 
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concern us presently and the distinction between basic and analogical similarity we employ refers to the 
objectives and scope of corresponding models.  
 The purpose of this work is to examine whether the QP basic similarity model can be further 
extended to cover some key requirements for analogical similarity, notably the way similarity 
computations are affected by correspondences between representation parts (we do not consider the 
mechanisms that lead to the discovery of which features align or not; this is an important aspect of 
research in analogical similarity, but beyond the scope of this work). An extension of this sort cannot be 
expected to perform as well on analogical similarity results, as thoroughbred models of analogical 
similarity (e.g., Goldstone, 1994b; Hahn et al., 2009; Larkey & Markman, 2005). Nevertheless, 
attempting the extension is important: if successful, it will show that the mathematical mechanisms for 
basic similarity judgments are (plausibly and to some extent) the same as the ones for analogical 
similarity judgments. Equally, if the general model leads to inferior fits in the novel domain, perhaps a 
restricted scope is more appropriate. This question of possible equivalence of mathematical 
mechanisms is separate from the one concerning brain systems (cf. Casale et al., 2012). Note also that 
most basic similarity models cannot account for structure in similarity judgments (Tversky, 1977, Ashby 
& Perrin, 1988; Krumhansl, 1978; we return to this point later). Likewise, current attempts to extend 
aŶalogiĐal siŵilaƌitǇ ŵodels to Đoǀeƌ TǀeƌskǇ͛s (1977) results have difficulties. This separatedness of the 
literatures on basic similarity and analogical similarity further motivate the present effort to develop a 
QP model of basic/analogical similarity.  
 As it turns out, there is a very straightforward way to extend the QP model of basic similarity 
iŶto oŶe of aŶalogiĐal siŵilaƌitǇ, usiŶg “ŵoleŶskǇ et al.͛s ;iŶ pƌess; “ŵoleŶskǇ, ϭϵϵϬͿ ideas foƌ ŵodeliŶg 
structure in linguistic representations. They were interested in the similarity between linguistic 
representations, where the role in one representation was compared to the role in the other, and 
likeǁise foƌ the filleƌs ;e.g., iŶ ƌelatioŶ to phoŶologǇ, a ƌole Đould ďe ͚sǇllaďle-oŶset͛ aŶd a ĐoƌƌespoŶdiŶg 
filleƌ Đould ďe ͚ƌ͛, foƌ the ǁoƌd ͚ƌat͛, as iŶ “ŵoleŶskǇ at et.͛s, iŶ pƌess, eǆaŵple, oŶ p.ϱͿ. TheǇ deƌiǀed 
their similarity method by employing a tensor product representation, which effectively separated out 
information of different kinds (roles, fillers), in separate vector spaces. “ŵoleŶskǇ et al.͛s ideas can be 
applied to the QP similarity model more or less as they are (since tensor products are standard in QP 
representations), thus revealing an interesting convergence between QP modeling and computational 
tools in prior, totally unrelated work. Does the resulting QP model of basic/analogical similarity have any 
interesting or unique properties? We take up this challenge in relation to possible interference in the 
contributions to similarity, from different parts of the compared objects. We also provide some 
indicative fits of the QP model, showing that, with a reasonable parameterization, the performance of 
the model is acceptable.  
 
 
2. Quantum probability theory in cognitive modeling and the quantum similarity model  
 
We briefly outline the QP model of basic similarity (for a more complete presentation and the 
appliĐatioŶ of the ŵodel to TǀeƌskǇ͛s, ϭϵϳϳ, fiŶdiŶgs see Pothos et al., ϮϬϭϯͿ. The QP basic similarity 
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model is based on a unit length state vector representing mental states, which exists in a Hilbert space. 
Subspaces of varying dimensionality represent the instances, objects, or concepts, which are to be 
compared. Each subspace is associated with a linear operator, called a projector. Projectors are 
fundamental in QP theory. Their funĐtioŶ is to take a ǀeĐtoƌ aŶd ͚laǇ it doǁŶ͛ oŶto a ĐoƌƌespoŶdiŶg 
subspace. Suppose we are interested in the similarity between objects A and B, such that the projectors 
to the corresponding subspaces are    and   . The mental state vector just prior to the comparison is 
denoted as   ۄ, in Dirac bra-ket notation, whereby   ۄ denotes a column vector and   ۄ  the complex 
conjugate of the transpose of   ۄ (and so a row vector). Then, according to the quantum similarity 
model, just prior to a comparison, the state vector is assumed to be neutral between the compared 
objects. For example, when comparing objects A and B, we assume        ۄ           ۄ    .1 This 
condition       ۄ         ۄ   on the state vector is equivalent to that of an uninformed Bayesian 
prior and basically means that the mental state prior to comparing objects A and B is such that it favors 
neither A nor B. As noted,    ሺ   ሻ      ሺ       ሻ, which is given by    ሺ   ሻ           ۄ  ; this is the squared length of the projection of the state vector, from the subspace of one 
compared entity, to the next. The specific interpretation of probability is that that the state vector is 
consistent with the first possibility and then the second (note that, a remarkable theorem by Gleason, 
1957, shows that the QP probability rule, for how to go from projections to probabilities, is unique).  
 As a simple illustration of the quantum similarity model, consider the case where A and B both 
correspond to unidimensional subspaces in a two-dimensional space. Let   ۄ and   ۄ be normalized 
column vectors along the A and B subspaces respectively. Then, the complex conjugate transpose 
vectors would be denoted as ۦ   and ۦ  . The corresponding projector operators are easily defined as, 
e.g.,   ۄۦ  . If   ۄ  [    ], then      ۄۦ   [    ] [      ], which is a 2x2 matrix. Also, ۦ   ۄ  [      ] [    ]               , that is, ۦ   ۄ is a dot product. With the above definition of 
similarity we have    ሺ   ሻ           ۄ      ۄۦ     ۄۦ     ۄ    ۦ   ۄ   ۦ   ۄ   and    ሺ   ሻ   ۦ   ۄ   ۦ   ۄ  , noting that the norm of   ۄ and   ۄ is 1 and that  ۦ   ۄ    ۦ   ۄ  . 
With the assumption that  ۦ   ۄ    ۦ   ۄ  , the relative similarity between A and B is effectively 
based on  ۦ   ۄ  . In a real space, ۦ   ۄ              , where   is the angle between the   ۄ and   ۄ vectors (normalization further means that |A|=|B|=1). Thus, overall,    ሺ   ሻ  ሺ    ሻ , that is, 
at least for objects represented with one-dimensional subspaces, similarity is just a decreasing function 
of the angle between the subspaces (up to     ). In brief, this explains how the quantum similarity 
model works and the basic intuition that drives its formulation.  
 
3. Extending to the QP model of basic similarity to analogical similarity  
 
We introduce the analogical extension to the QP model of basic similarity, using a standard example of 
analogical similarity, from Goldstone (1994b). In one of his experiments, participants were asked to 
                                                          
1
 Note, the double lines indicate the norm of the projected vector and single lines the modulus of a complex 
number. As in all cases we are dealing with normalized vectors, norms such as the above resolve to computing the 
modulus of dot products. So, to simplify notation, henceforth we will just write e.g.       ۄ  . 
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compare drawings of birds with four distinct parts, left wing, right wing, body, and head (Figure 1). Each 
part would include a specific feature (one of 21 random symbols). The features for the four parts can be 
deŶoted ǁith fouƌ letteƌs, suĐh as ABCD. Thus, a ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ iŶ GoldstoŶe͛s ;ϭϵϵϰďͿ eǆpeƌiŵeŶt ĐaŶ ďe 
denoted as ABCD vs. BADC. In this particular comparison, the two birds share four features, but the 
shared features do not correspond to the same parts of the birds. Goldstone (1994b) called such 
matches MOPs, that is, matches out of place. By analogy, MIPs, matches in place, are shared features for 
the same parts of the bird. Thus, the two representations ABCD and ABXZ would have two MIPs. The 
distinction between MIPs and MOPs captures a fundamental aspect of structure in representations, 
namely the fact that particular features could be shared between two objects, without corresponding to 
the same part of the objects. Goldstone (1994b) found that MIPs have more of an impact on similarity 
than MOPs, but both MIPs and MOPs increase similarity. He also reported that having both a MIP and a 
MOP for the same feature (e.g., AACD compared to ABXZ) would actually lead to a lower rating, than 
just a corresponding MIP (e.g., AYXZ). Specifically, in his Experiment 2 (stimuli were schematic birds with 
symbols), the similarity result for comparing objects with three MIPs was higher than the result with 
three MIPs and one MOP (Figure 7, p.11). Goldstone (1994b) considered this result important enough to 
highlight the ability of his model,  (Similarity as Interactive Activation and Mapping; SIAM) to capture it, 
against competitors. But, the corresponding difference was not significant and not replicated in Larkey 
and Markman (2005).  Finally, Note that there is a related distinction in the literature, between aligned 
and unaligned differences (e.g., Markman & Gentner, 1996). The consideration of similarity using 
aligned and unaligned differences is not quite equivalent to that of MIPs and MOPs but, as far as we can 
see, there are no relevant implications in the discussion below. 
 
Figure 1. A figure reproduced from Goldstone (1994b; Figure 6), illustrating the stimuli employed in his 
Experiment 2. [Note to copy editor: according to APA guidelines, permission is not required for 
reproducing a maximum of three figures or tables from a journal article.]  
 
Smolensky et al. (in press) solved the problem of introducing structure into geometric 
representations in the context of combinatorial structure in connectionist models of language 
processing. Specifically, his starting point (Smolensky et al., in press) was two structured representations 
“ aŶd “͛, which were composed of roles (denoted by r) and fillers for each role (denoted by f). In other 
words,            and              , whereby          denotes a set of roles and corresponding 
fillers. For example, “ aŶd “͛ ŵight ďe tǁo diffeƌeŶt syllables, r diffeƌeŶt ƌoles, suĐh as ͚oŶset͛ oƌ ͚Đoda͛, 
and f possible fillers, i.e., phonemes. Then, Smolensky et al. suggested that the similarity between these 
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structured representations should be given by a scheme which computes    ሺ    ሻ  ∑ ∑    ሺ        ሻ     ሺ      ሻ, that is, a scheme which computes the similarity between 
the corresponding fillers, for all combinations of roles. Smolensky (1990; Smolensky et al., in press) 
noted that one way to implement this similarity measure is by considering the tensor product between 
roles and fillers and it is this approach which we adopt in the QP model of basic/analogical similarity. 
Note that other researchers have employed SmoleŶskǇ͛s ;ϭϵϵϬͿ teŶsoƌ pƌoduĐt idea iŶ aŶalogǇ 
formation (e.g., Wiles et al., 1994; see also Humphreys et al., 1989), but placed less emphasis on the 
distinction between of MIPs and MOPs. In Wiles et al. (1994) work, tensors are employed to examine 
analogies ďetǁeeŶ e.g. ͞ŵotheƌ: ďaďǇ͟ aŶd ͞ŵaƌe: foal͟. HuŵphƌeǇs et al.͛s (1989) model is a model of 
memory, whereby tensor products are employed to bind words with their contexts. Also, some 
researchers have pointed out that a tensor product scheme for combining roles and fillers may involve a 
combinatorial explosioŶ of oǀeƌall diŵeŶsioŶalitǇ. It͛s uŶĐleaƌ hoǁ ŵuĐh a pƌoďleŵ this is iŶ pƌaĐtiĐe. 
Smolensky et al. (in press) argued that it is not. Also, in similarity applications, a problem of overall 
dimensionality is likely to be less severe than in language.  
What is the subset of possible role combinations allowed? This depends entirely on how the 
vectors for roles are set up. In the most general form for the similarity measure,    ሺ    ሻ  ∑ ∑    ሺ        ሻ     ሺ      ሻ, it should be clear that all combinations of roles are allowed, so that 
the similarity measure is consistent with both MIPs and MOPs.  
We first illustrate our approach just for MIPs, for simple objects having three distinct parts, top, 
ŵiddle, aŶd ďottoŵ ;a paƌt is like a ƌole iŶ “ŵoleŶskǇ et al.͛s eǆaŵple aďoǀeͿ. Each part can be any of 
two shapes, a square or a circle. Moreover, any shape can be any of two colors, say blue and red (the 
shapes and colors are possible fillers, for the roles above). Following Smolensky (1990; Smolensky et al., 
in press), we suggest that the set of all such objects would be represented by vectors of the form          ۄ       ۄ       ۄ              ۄ       ۄ       ۄ              ۄ       ۄ       ۄ. Note that in our approach the rank of the tensors depends on the 
number of elementary features, which together characterize an object part (for an alternative approach 
see Wiles et al., 1994). The role vectors indicate the part under consideration and, since we are 
assuming only MIPs, we can set these to a canonical basis to write 
 
 (   )       ۄ       ۄ  (   )       ۄ       ۄ  (   )       ۄ       ۄ  (1)  
 
The tensor product of the part vector, with the vector corresponding to shape, and the vector 
corresponding to color, allows all combinations of shapes and colors for each part.  
In the QP basic similarity model, the similarity between two objects, A and B, is    ሺ   ሻ           ۧ  . In the extended QP model of basic/analogical similarity, the definition of similarity is 
identical. The similarity computation is straightforward to carry out. Note first that we can write    ሺ   ሻ     ۄۃ   ۄۃ   ۄ  . The first dot product, ۃ   ۄ, can be ignored, since we require the state 
vector,   ۄ, to be neutral with respect to the A and B rays (i.e.,  ۦ   ۄ    ۦ   ۄ  ሻ. The   ۄ term can 
be ignored as well, since    ۄ    . Therefore, we can write    ሺ   ሻ   ۃ   ۄ  . The dot product is 
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 ۃ   ۄ  ۃ(   )  ሺ     ሻ  ሺ     ሻ  (   )  ሺ     ሻ  ሺ     ሻ  (   )  ሺ     ሻ  ሺ     ሻ   (   )  ሺ     ሻ  ሺ     ሻ  (   )  ሺ     ሻ  ሺ     ሻ  (   )  ሺ     ሻ  ሺ     ሻ ۄ (2)  
 
This leads to 
 ۦ             ۧ      ۦ             ۧ       ۦ             ۧ      ۦ             ۧ       ۦ             ۧ      ۦ             ۧ              (3)  
 
 The above computation is simpler than perhaps how it looks. All terms combine with each other 
and each individual dot product is of the form ۃ            ۄ  ۃ    ۄۃ    ۄۃ    ۄ. In other words, 
the dot pƌoduĐt ďetǁeeŶ tǁo teŶsoƌ pƌoduĐts deĐoŵposes iŶto dot pƌoduĐts foƌ eaĐh ͚slot͛ (space) 
separately. The first of these dot products involves the vector for the particular parts under 
consideration in the two objects. But, these part vectors have been set up in such a way that, unless 
they are the same, their dot product is zero. For example, consider the dot product involving the first 
part of object A and the second part of object B. This is  
 ۃ(   )  ሺ     ሻ  ሺ     ሻ  (   )  ሺ     ሻ  ሺ     ሻ ۄ  ሺ     ሻ (   )       (4) 
 
So, overall, this particular way of setting up the part vectors readily allows for similarity comparisons to 
be faithful to structure, in the sense that shape equivalence adds to the similarity computation, only 
when the corresponding parts are the same between the two objects. In brief, this is a scheme for MIPs.  
 The QP model of basic/analogical similarity can easily allow for contributions to similarity from 
MOPs as well, in a way identical to that of Smolensky et al. (in press), by allowing non-orthogonal part 
vectors (i.e., non-orthogonal roles). Note that, in the QP model, MOPs can only arise from similarities 
between roles; if roles have no similarity structure, then the QP model must predict no MOPs. We are 
also now led to a key distinction between the QP model of basic/analogical similarity and Smolensky et 
al.͛s ;iŶ pƌessͿ approach. The native space of QP representations is complex. In QP theory, complex 
numbers are employed as a technical convenience and all outputs of the theory are guaranteed to be 
real. But, in part because of the use of complex vectors, QP theory computations sometimes give rise to 
interference effects, not possible with real vectors. Therefore, with non-orthogonal, complex vectors for 
roles, we are led to the possibility of not only MOPs, but of interference effects between MOPs and 
MIPs.  
To illustrate, consider a simplified example of two objects created of two possible features in 
two possible roles, so that               and                , noting that    is the role vector 
for the first part and    the role vector for the second part. The actual features   ,    etc. could be the 
same or not, this is not relevant presently. Then,    ሺ   ሻ   ۃ   ۄ  . The inner product is computed 
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as ۃ   ۄ  ۃ                         ۄ  ۃ      ۄ  ۃ      ۄ  ۃ     ۄۃ      ۄ  ۃ     ۄۃ      ۄ. The 
first two terms are contributions from MIPs; the cross-terms are MOPs. Here, we are only concerned 
with the cross-terms, since the MIPs contribution cannot change by altering the role vectors. We can 
rewrite the cross-terms as:        ۃ     ۄ  ۃ     ۄ , where   ۃ      ۄ and  ۃ      ۄ. 
Depending on the form of   ,   , there is potential for the cross-terms to reduce the overall value of ۃ   ۄ, when the contributions to similarity from MOPs can be negative. This is simply illustrated in two 
dimensions. Letting x, y, a, b, be all positive, real numbers, consider four possibilities:  
    ቀ  ቁ,    ቀ  ቁ, then ۃ     ۄ  ۃ     ۄ  ሺ     ሻሺ   ሻ    (5a)    ቀ   ቁ,    ቀ  ቁ, then ۃ     ۄ  ۃ     ۄ    ሺ   ሻ     ሺ   ሻ   (5b)    ቀ   ቁ,    ቀ   ቁ, then ۃ     ۄ  ۃ     ۄ     ሺ   ሻ     ሺ   ሻ   (5c)    (    ),    ቀ      ቁ, then ۃ     ۄ  ۃ     ۄ   ሺ     ሻሺ   ሻ   (5d) 
 
In the first case, we have a baseline, additive, positive contribution from MOPs to similarity. In 
cases (5b) and (5c) the contribution from MOPs is lower, relative to that in the baseline case (5a). Finally, 
in case (5d) the contribution to similarity from MOPs is negative, meaning that the similarity we would 
expect from MIPs would be reduced, because of MOPs. Note that all the modifications to the role 
vectors do not alter their norm (i.e., the computations for MIPs are unaffected).  
 Thus, with complex role vectors, the QP model of basic/analogical similarity predicts a possibility 
that MOPs will interfere with MIPs, which is a novel prediction from the QP model of basic/analogical 
similarity. GoldstoŶe͛s ;ϭϵϵϰďͿ “IAM ŵodel ĐaŶ also predict such an interference. The QP model and 
SIAM are not necessarily competing models, as they emphasize different aspects of psychological 
explanation (the QP model is concerned with the guiding mathematical principles, SIAM is a network 
model aimed at capturing underlying processes). As noted, Goldstone (1994b) indeed reported a 
nonsignificant trend where MOPs reduce the overall similarity between two objects. Exploring the 
reality of such interference effects and identifying the circumstances which make them likely is an 
exciting (and challenging) direction for further work. For example, perhaps more complex stimuli, for 
which the different roles have complex relationships with each other (such as those employed in 
Goldstone, 1994b), make interference effects more likely, as opposed to stimuli with simpler structure 
and more schematic form (e.g., Larkey & Markman, 2005). Note, GoldstoŶe͛s ;ϭϵϵϰďͿ oǁŶ ǀieǁ was that 
such interference effects arise when the same feature is involved in both a MIP and a MOP.  
 
4. Further exploring the QP model of basic/analogical similarity 
4.1 Analytical examination 
 
In Section 3 we provided an example for how the QP model of basic/analogical similarity can account for 
MIPs and MOPs (and possible interference effects between the two). Here, first, we consider the formal 
properties of the model more systematically, with an emphasis on three main findings from Goldstone 
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(1994b): (1) MIPs have more of an impact on similarity than MOPs, (2) MIPS increase similarity, and (3) 
MOPs increase similarity. Second, having analytically examined the formal sensitivity of the model to 
these aspects of structural similarity, we provide a computational demonstration of its behavior.  
We use the terminology of Smolensky et al. (in press), to make it easier to appreciate the links 
between our work and theirs. Consider objects composed of n roles (these would be analogous to 
stimulus components or parts, in the language of basic similarity models) and a set of fillers for each role 
(a filler is a feature, that is, the way in which a particular stimulus component can appear). Let |r1>, 
|r2>,…, |ƌn> be n-dimensional positive real vectors with unit length representing the roles. Let |fi> be a 
real unit length vector representing the filler associated with role i. A standard simplifying assumption in 
similarity research is that fillers are orthonormal, so that there is no similarity between the different e.g. 
features which make up a schematic stimulus. Although we assume filler orthonormality in this section, 
the QP model does not require it; we discuss the implications of violating this assumption and, also, do 
not require it in the computational demonstration (Ŷote, GoldstoŶe͛s, ϭϵϵϰď, ŵodel iŶĐoƌpoƌates 
violations of filler orthonormality in terms of a global parameter). Note that, unless stated otherwise, 
role orthonormality is not assumed (MOPs arise when roles are not orthonormal).  
 In the quantum similarity model, an object S is represented by the tensor product r1  f1 + r2  f2 
+ …+ ƌn  fn. The similarity ďetǁeeŶ tǁo oďjeĐts “ aŶd “͛ ĐaŶ be written as the following, up to a 
normalizing constant: 
 
 
 
                                      (6) 
 
A MIP ďetǁeeŶ “ aŶd “͛ iŵplies theƌe is soŵe ƌole i, suĐh that the filleƌs foƌ the ƌole ŵatĐh, <fi|fi͛> = ϭ. A 
MOP betǁeeŶ “ aŶd “͛ iŵplies theƌe aƌe ƌoles i aŶd j, ǁhiĐh aƌe Ŷot oƌthoŶoƌŵal ;i.e., 0 < |<ri|rj>|ч 1; 
note that <ri|rj> could be negative, hence the absolute value is necessary), such that the fillers match, 
<fi|fj͛> = ϭ. In other words, the existence of a MOP implies the conjunction of two things: |<ri|rj>| > 0 
and <fi|fj͛> = 1. Also, notice that |<ri|rj>| ч |<ri|ri>| = 1, because of the assumption that role vectors 
have unit length. That is, matching roles will have more impact on similarity judgments, than non-
matching roles.  
 Our first claim is that MIPs have more of an impact on similarity than MOPs. Let “, “͛, aŶd “͛͛ 
haǀe Ŷ ƌoles. Let “ aŶd “͛ haǀe k ч Ŷ MIPs ;aŶd Ŷo MOPsͿ aŶd let “ aŶd “͛͛ haǀe k ч n MOPs (and no 
MIPs). If different fillers are orthonormal, that is, <fi|fi> = 1 and <fi|fi͛> = Ϭ foƌ fi ≠ fi͛, then “iŵ;“, “͛Ϳ ш 
“iŵ;“, “͛͛Ϳ. The proof is straightforward. “iŶĐe theƌe aƌe Ŷo MOPs iŶ the ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ of “ aŶd “͛, all of the 
fillers for mismatching roles are different. Then, <fi|fj͛> =Ϭ foƌ all i ≠ j because of filler orthonormality.  
The presence of MIPs implies there are exactly k ч n nonzero terms of the form <ri|ri><fi|fi͛> ǁheƌe 
<ri|ri> = 1 and <fi|fi͛> = ϭ. “iŶĐe theƌe aƌe Ŷo MIPs iŶ the ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ of “ aŶd “͛͛, all of the fillers for 
matching roles are different. That is,  <fi|fi͛͛> =0 for all i, because of filler orthonormality. The presence 
of n MOPs implies there are exactly k ч n nonzero terms of the form <ri|rj><fi|fj͛͛> ǁheƌe Ϭ < |<ri|rj>| ч 1 
and <fi|fj͛͛> = ϭ. BeĐause |<ri|ri>| ш |<ri|rj>| foƌ all i aŶd j, “iŵ;“, “͛Ϳ ш “iŵ;“, “͛͛Ϳ.  
Without filler orthonormality, we could have situations where two objects have a high similarity 
without either MIPs or MOPs. Suppose <ri|rj>≠0 (no MIPs) and we do not have the same feature in the 
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roles i, j (no MOPs). Then, without filler orthonormality, there could be instances when <fi|fj͛> > 0. 
Depending on the similarity structure of the features, a large number of (relatively high value) cross-
terms of this form could exceed the contribution of a small (or zero) number of actual MIPs or MOPs, in 
a different comparison. This partly illustrates why filler orthonormality is a useful assumption in practical 
research, since ignoring cross-terms (i.e., ignoring contributions to similarity which are neither MIPs nor 
MOPs and, instead, arise from similarity between non-identical features) makes similarity computations 
and modeling more tractable.   
 The second claim concerns the impact of MIPs on similarity judgments. We show that increasing 
the number of MIPs increases similarity. Specifically, suppose “ aŶd “͛ haǀe ŵoƌe MIPs thaŶ “ aŶd “͛͛ 
and there are no MOPs. Then, if different fillers are orthonormal, that is, <fi|fi> = 1 and <fi|fi͛> = Ϭ foƌ fi ≠ 
fi͛, it will be the case that “iŵ;“, “͛Ϳ > “iŵ;“, “͛͛Ϳ. To prove this, note first that, since there are no MOPs, 
all of the fillers for mismatching roles are different. That is, <fi|fj͛> = 0 and <fi|fj͛͛> = Ϭ foƌ all i ≠ j because 
of filler orthonormality. The remaining terms correspond to matching roles and are of the form 
<ri|ri><fi|fi͛> foƌ “iŵ;“, “͛Ϳ aŶd <ƌi|ri><fi|fi͛͛> foƌ “iŵ;“, “͛͛Ϳ, where <ri|ri> = 1 for all i. A MIP implies the 
same filler in matching roles. Because we assume the fillers are orthonormal, <fi|fi͛> = ϭ if fi = fi͛ aŶd zeƌo 
otherwise, likewise for <fi|fi͛͛>. BeĐause “ aŶd “͛ haǀe ŵoƌe MIPs thaŶ “ aŶd “͛͛, theƌe eǆist ŵoƌe filleƌs 
fi͛ suĐh that fi = fi͛ thaŶ filleƌs fi͛͛ suĐh that fi = fi͛͛.  Thus, theƌe aƌe ŵoƌe ŶoŶzeƌo teƌŵs eƋual to ϭ iŶ the 
calculation of “iŵ;“, “͛Ϳ thaŶ “iŵ;“, “͛͛Ϳ.  
 Eliminating the assumption of filler orthonormality potentially confounds this conclusion. 
Suppose theƌe aƌe feǁeƌ MIPs iŶ ĐoŵpaƌiŶg “ ǁith “͛͛, thaŶ iŶ ĐoŵpaƌiŶg “ ǁith “͛, aŶd Ŷo MOPs. IŶ 
ĐoŵpaƌiŶg “ ǁith “͛͛, it Đould ďe the Đase that theƌe is a laƌge ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ fƌom feature pairs where the 
roles are identical, but <fi|fi͛>≠1 (i.e., no MIP) and <fi|fi͛> > 0.  
 By analogy with the second claim, the third claim is that MOPs increase similarity. That is, 
suppose “ aŶd “͛͛ haǀe a suďset of the MOPs of “ aŶd “͛ aŶd theƌe aƌe Ŷo MIPs ;e.g., ABCD ǀs. BCX) 
compared to ABCD vs. BCDZ). If different fillers are orthonormal, theŶ “iŵ;“, “͛Ϳ > “iŵ;“, “͛͛Ϳ. For the 
proof, consider that, if there are no MIPs, then all of the fillers for matching roles are different. That is, 
<fi|fi͛>= Ϭ aŶd <fi|fi͛͛> = Ϭ foƌ all i because of filler orthonormality. The remaining terms corresponding to 
mismatching roles are of the form <ri|rj><fi|fj͛> foƌ “iŵ;“, “͛Ϳ aŶd <ƌi|rj><fi|fj͛͛> foƌ “iŵ;“, “͛͛Ϳ ǁheƌe 
<ri|rj> > 0. A MOP implies the same filler in different roles. Because we assume the fillers are 
orthonormal, <fi|fj͛> = ϭ if fi = fj͛ aŶd Ϭ otheƌǁise, likeǁise foƌ <fi|fj͛͛>. BeĐause “ aŶd “͛͛ haǀe a suďset of 
the MOPs of “ aŶd “͛, there exist some i and j such that fi = fj͛ aŶd fi ≠ fj͛͛. (Note that the MOPs of S and 
“͛͛ iŶǀolǀe the saŵe ƌole ǀeĐtoƌs as the MOPs of “ aŶd “͛, due to the faĐt the MOPs of “ aŶd “͛͛ aƌe a 
suďset of those of “ aŶd “͛.Ϳ Therefore, there are more nonzero terms of the form <ri|rj><fi|fj͛> for 
“iŵ;“, “͛Ϳ thaŶ terms of the form <ri|rj><fi|fj͛͛>  for “iŵ;“, “͛͛Ϳ. 
 The implications for violating filler orthonormality are as above. Here, additionally, we have to 
take into account the similarity structure between roles, between the compared stimuli. All the MOPs 
concern terms for which <fi|fj͛> = ϭ. In addition, for a MOP, we have <ri|rj> > 0. But the exact magnitude 
of <ri|rj> will depend on role similarity and this may vary from comparison to comparison. It could be 
the case that a smaller number of MOPs could contribute more to similarity than a greater number of 
MOPs, if the ƌole siŵilaƌities foƌ the foƌŵeƌ aƌe suitaďlǇ higheƌ. This is ǁhǇ the ͚suďset͛ assuŵptioŶ is 
needed to prove this third claim. For simple, schematic stimuli, it is reasonable to assume that role 
similarity is flat, that is, all terms of the form <ri|rj>, which are nonzero, have the same magnitude. In 
13  structure in similarity 
 
suĐh a Đase, the ͚suďset͛ assuŵptioŶ is Ŷot Ŷeeded aŶd this claim can be proved just on the basis of filler 
orthonormality.  
 
4.2 Computational examination  
 
The analytical demonstration shows that broad level predictions from the QP model are sensible. But 
how well does the QP model perform, against relevant models? We considered the results from 
Hodgetts, HahŶ, aŶd Chateƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ EǆpeƌiŵeŶt ϭ. Hodgetts et al. ;ϮϬϬϵͿ ďuilt on previous empirical 
studies on analogical similarity (e.g., Larkey & Markman, 2005) and, moreover, they reported results 
from a range of relevant models. Their Experiment 1 is the simplest one in their paper and so suitable 
for this first computational examination of the QP model of basic/analogical similarity.  
 The ƌesults fƌoŵ Hodgetts et al.͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ EǆpeƌiŵeŶt ϭ ĐoŶsisted of ϭϯ oďjeĐt paiƌs, ǁith 
information on the proportion of times each object pair was selected, amongst alternative object pairs, 
in a forced choice task. Selection was based on the perceived similarity between the objects making up 
an object pair. Each object was composed of two features (out of three available, denoted A,B, and C), 
each placed in one of two positions (i.e., two roles). Thus, an object pair could be represented as AA/AA, 
indicating that the same features appeared in both roles, for both objects. Unsurprisingly, this object 
pair was selected most frequently (91.56% of all times). By contrast, object pair AB/BB was selected only 
about half the time. The least selected object pair was AB/CC (23.57%). Hodgetts et al. (2009) 
manipulated the physical form of the three features, so that, depending on the condition, A could be 
any of a circle, a square, or a triangle.  
 To motivate the parametric choices for the QP model, consider a simple example of computing 
the similarity between objects, such that                     and                   (for the 
second object and henceforth we omit the tensor product symbol). Then,    ሺ               ሻ   ۃ                   ۄ    ۃ     ۄ  ۃ     ۄ  ۃ     ۄۃ     ۄ  ۃ     ۄۃ     ۄ  , whereby the first 
two terms are contributions from MIPs and the latter two from MOPs. Casually inspecting Hodgetts et 
al.͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ EǆpeƌiŵeŶt ϭ data, it is clear that there are contributions from MOPs (e.g., the object pair 
AB/BA was chosen quite frequently; without MOPs, the two objects in the pair would have no 
similarity). Therefore, we have to allow for non-orthogonal role vectors. Also, the data indicate that the 
assumption of feature orthonormality is not tenable as well (e.g., AB/AA was not chosen as equally 
often as AB/BB). Indeed, intuitively, it is unlikely that participants considered a square, circle, and 
triangle as maximally dissimilar and equally similar to each other.  
 Based on these observations, we chose to represent roles as non-orthogonal vectors in a two 
dimensional real space and features as non-orthogonal vectors in a separate two dimensional real 
space. The restriction to real spaces implies no possibility of interference between the contribution to 
similarity from MIPs and MOPs, which is reasonable, given our preliminary intuitions for when to expect 
such effects (Section 3). Note, employing a two dimensional real space for three features implies that it 
is impossible for the three features to be orthonormal, but limits the overall number of parameters. 
Overall, the QP model had three parameters, one to characterize feature A, one for feature B, and one 
for the first role. Since all vectors are normalized and two-dimensional, a single parameter is needed to 
characterize any vector. The vector for feature C was fixed to 
 √ [  ], since what matters is the relative 
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similarity structure of the three feature vectors and we allowed A and B to vary freely; likewise, the 
vector for the second role was fixed to [  ]. We allowed the free parameters to vary, so as to optimize 
the correlation between the similarities between object pairs, computed by the QP model, and the 
empirically observed choice proportion for each pair.  
The best identified correlation was 0.81 and the results are illustrated in Figure 2 (the 
optimization was carried in Matlab and the code is available from the authors). The ͚ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶal 
distoƌtioŶ͛ ŵodel, favored by Hodgetts et al. (2009), achieved a correlation of -0.95. Hodgetts et al. 
(2009) also report that the correlation for the Structure Mapping Engine model (SME; Falkenhainer, 
Forbus, & Gentner, 1989) was 0.74, the correlation for the SIAM model (Goldstone, 1994b) 0.76, and the 
correlation which can be achieved by the best linear weighting of MIPs and MOPs 0.77 (this value is 
inferred from Figure 9 in Hodgetts et al., 2009). 
 We note the limitations of the QP model. First, achieving the correlation of 0.81 relied on post 
hoc fitting of three free parameters. By contrast, the representational distortion model had no free 
parameters (the predictions are based on the specification of a coding scheme), regarding SIAM 
Hodgetts et al. (2009) employed a recycled set of paƌaŵeteƌ ǀalues fƌoŵ pƌeǀious ǁoƌk, aŶd “ME͛s 
application involved no parameters anyway. Thus, the QP model failed to achieve the best fit, even 
though it was aided by the greatest number of parameters. We can only consider the performance of 
the QP model as promising, given of course that this is the very first application of the QP model in this 
domain.  
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Figure 2. Comparison of the observed choice data from Experiment 1 (Hodgetts et al., 2009) and the 
best fit of the QP model of basic/analogical similarity, with a regression line.  
 
5. A brief consideration of alternative approaches 
The similarity literature is vast and it is beyond our objective to summarize it in detail (for a review, see 
Goldstone & Son, 2005). We consider a limited range of basic similarity or analogy models, with a view 
to illustrate some of the points made throughout this paper.  
 One important motivation for the present paper has been our argument that basic similarity 
models are ill equipped to handle analogical similarity. This can be illustrated fairly simply. Distance-
based models of similarity and feature-ďased ŵodels ;suĐh as TǀeƌskǇ͛s, 1977, model) could, in principle, 
account for some analogical aspects of similarity (e.g., through the introduction of conjunctive features 
or dimensions). In simple distance-based models of similarity, the similarity between two entities A and 
B is given by    ሺ   ሻ              ሺ  ሻ, where c is a constant. In TǀeƌskǇ͛s (1977) proposal,           ሺ   ሻ    ሺ   ሻ    ሺ   ሻ    ሺ   ሻ, where       are parameters,     
denotes the common features between A and B, A-B the features of A which B does not have and B-A 
the features of B which A does not have. In both cases structure could be modeled by conjunctive 
dimensions or features (e.g., dimension 1 is shape for feature 1 etc.; cf. Goldstone & Son, 2005), but 
such a solution is not elegant and appears demanding, in terms of representational resources. 
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Moreover, a distance-based model of similarity could be augmented with a tensor product approach, 
aŶalogous to “ŵoleŶskǇ et al.͛s ;iŶ pƌessͿ ŵethod. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁithout fuƌtheƌ ƌefiŶeŵeŶts, suĐh a 
distance-ďased ŵodel ǁould still haǀe diffiĐultǇ ǁith TǀeƌskǇ͛s ;ϭϵϳϳͿ eŵpiƌiĐal fiŶdiŶgs.  
Two important approaches in basic similarity are KƌuŵhaŶsl͛s ;ϭϵϳϴ, ϭϵϴϴͿ distaŶĐe-density 
model aŶd AshďǇ aŶd PeƌƌiŶ͛s ;ϭϵϴϴͿ geŶeƌal ƌeĐogŶitioŶ theoƌǇ. The foƌŵeƌ ŵodel assumes that 
alternatives lying within dense subregions of psychological space are subject to finer discrimination than 
alternatives lying in less dense subregions. This implies that the distance (dissimilarity) between two 
points A and B in psychological space should be affected by the local density around each point,  ሺ ሻ 
and ሺ ሻ. Thus,   ሺ   ሻ   ሺ   ሻ    ሺ ሻ    ሺ ሻ, where  ሺ   ሻ is the standard geometric 
distance, a and b are parameters, and   ሺ   ሻ is the modified distance measure. These ideas are 
interesting, but it is unclear how to generalize them in the case of structured representations. Ashby and 
PeƌƌiŶ͛s ;ϭϵϴϴͿ general recognition theory is a probabilistic approach to similarity for perceptual stimuli. 
Each stimulus (e.g., presented in different trials) can correspond to different points in psychological 
space, according to a particular probability distribution. Psychological space is divided into response 
regions, such that within each response region it is optimal to make a particular response. Thus, 
similarity between two stimuli depends on the overlap between the distribution of perceptual effects 
for the first stimulus and the optimal response region for the second stimulus. As with KƌuŵhaŶsl͛s 
(1978) model, it is unclear how to extend AshďǇ aŶd PeƌƌiŶ͛s ;ϭϵϴϴͿ appƌoaĐh to take into account the 
structure of particular stimuli.  
We Ŷoǁ tuƌŶ to the ĐoŶǀeƌse poiŶt: ĐaŶ ŵodels of aŶalogiĐal siŵilaƌitǇ Đoǀeƌ TǀeƌskǇ͛s ;ϭϵϳϳͿ 
key results? Some models of analogical similarity do not consider these results in a detailed way (e.g., 
Gentner, 1983; Larkey & Love, 2003; Markman & Gentner, 1996). An interesting proposal is Taylor and 
Huŵŵel͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ LI“A ŵodel, which involves a representation scheme analogous to that of Smolensky 
(1990), but for the crucial difference that roles and fillers are combined additively, rather than 
multiplicatively. This means that the impact of role similarity is independent of the impact of filler 
similarity, in establishing an analogy. Regarding computations of similarity, the similarity between two 
objects A and B reflects a term from MIPs and a term from MOPs. Consider trying to map the structure 
of a source, S, to a target, T. Then, the similarity between the two is given by       ሺ   ሻ      ሺ   ሻ      ሺ   ሻ, where     ሺ   ሻ and     ሺ   ሻ is a contribution from MIPs and MOPs, 
respectively. The first term provides a measure of the extent to which units in S uniquely map onto units 
in T. The second term,     ሺ   ሻ, is a measure of similarity across all objects and roles in T and S, with 
no regard of whether they map or not. Hoǁ ǁell does LI“A faiƌ ǁith TǀeƌskǇ͛s ;ϭϵϳϳͿ ŵaiŶ fiŶdiŶgs? A 
key result is that    ሺ           ሻ>   ሺ           ሻ, originally explained as arising, in part, 
ďeĐause paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of ChiŶa ǁould iŶǀolǀe more features, than that of Korea. The MIPs 
term in LISA can be shown to have the form 
                                                   and it can lead to similarity 
asymmetries, when there are differences in the number of features for A and B. Thus, the LISA model 
can explain the Korea, China asymmetry. AŶotheƌ oŶe of TǀeƌskǇ͛s ;ϭϵϳϳͿ keǇ ƌesults, a violation of the 
triangle inequality, involved similarities amongst three countries, Cuba, Jamaica, Russia. Here, for LISA to 
accommodate the result in the observed direction, it had to be assumed that Russia was represented in 
terms of government, Cuba in terms of government and climate, and Jamaica in terms of climate, so 
introducing a somewhat arbitrary difference in the extent of representations. Notwithstanding the fact 
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that, as far as we can judge, LISA is a very competent model of analogy, we think that its coverage of 
TǀeƌskǇ͛s ;ϭϵϳϳͿ ŵaiŶ ƌesults is Ŷot fullǇ satisfaĐtoƌǇ. The speĐifiĐatioŶ of LI“A iŶǀolǀes many 
architectural choices, which are not always possible to fully constrain. In this way we illustrate what we 
think is a general feature of models of analogical similarity: the emphasis is on the computational 
procedures which can lead to the identification of MIPs and MOPs (something currently unspecified in 
the QP model), not on the algebraic properties of similarity judgments; it is the latter that bears on 
ǁhetheƌ satisfaĐtoƌǇ Đoǀeƌage ǁith TǀeƌskǇ͛s ;ϭϵϳϳͿ ƌesults ĐaŶ ďe aĐhieǀed oƌ Ŷot.  
Finally, another model of analogical similarity, the representational distortion model (Hahn et 
al., 2003; Hodgetts et al., 2009) could account for violations of symmetry in similarity judgments if, for 
example, removing elements from a representation can be assumed to be easier (carry a lower 
information cost) than adding elements (Hahn et al., 2009). Thus, when comparing an informationally 
simpler object with a more complex one, we should obtain    ሺ              ሻ     ሺ              ሻ. The model also appears consistent with violations 
of the triangle inequality, if, for example, one assumes that in e.g. the case of Russia and Cuba the 
ĐoŵŵoŶ politiĐal sǇsteŵ faĐilitates the ͚tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ͛ of oŶe oďjeĐt to the otheƌ. Thus, the 
representational distortion model potentially encompasses both basic similarity and analogical similarity 
results (see also, Hodgetts & Hahn, 2012).    
Where we note shortcomings of the above models, we do not imply criticism, as we examined 
their application in non-native empirical domains. We simply wish to argue that developing a model 
encompassing both basic similarity and analogical similarity, as we have attempted to do with the QP 
model, is a non-trivial task.  
 
6. Concluding comments 
It is uncontroversial to state that it is desirable to extend specific cognitive models as much as possible. 
Such extensions inform our understanding of commonalities regarding the underlying cognitive 
processes, across perhaps seemingly disparate aspects of behavior. They also enable us to understand 
boundaries in the applicability of particular formalisms and hence the motivation for domain-specific 
mechanisms or principles. It was in this spirit that we set out to explore whether Pothos, Busemeyer, 
aŶd Tƌueďlood͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ QP ŵodel of basic similarity could be extended to analogical similarity. We took 
this to be an interesting challenge, especially because geometric models of basic similarity (such as the 
QP model) have been thought to be incapable of accommodating structure in similarity judgments (cf. 
Goldstone & Son, 2005). As things stand, the QP model of basic/analogical similarity we reported can 
cover certain aspects of decision making (as in Busemeyer et al., 2011), basic similarity (Pothos et al., 
2013), and analogical similarity (the present paper).  
 We think that the QP model of basic/analogical similarity is, at the very least, a promising 
candidate for further consideration in the analogical similarity literature. Its formal properties are 
consistent with expectation, e.g., in relation to the relative impact of MIPs and MOPs. The 
computational analysis we carried out, based on the results from Experiment 1 of Hodgetts et al. (2009), 
revealed a decent performance from the QP model, in relation to some standard models of analogical 
similarity. This was an encouraging preliminary result and recommends further similar computational 
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examinations. e.g., against alternative datasets. Moreover, we identified an interesting novel prediction 
from the QP model. In standard QP theory, representations are defined over complex, not real, vector 
spaces. In analogical similarity, employing complex vectors for roles can lead to interference effects 
between the contributions for MIPs and MOPs. In other words, the QP model predicts (fairly naturally) 
that there will be some cases when MOPs will conflict with MIPs and so reduce overall similarity 
(Goldstone, 1994b, states such an implication from his SIAM model too). Developing this prediction in a 
more specific way is an ambitious objective, though it may be possible to borrow insights from other QP 
modeling work, for when interference is expected (e.g., Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012).  
 In this work we focused on the key challenge for models of analogical similarity of representing 
structure in a way that it is consistent with MIPs and MOPs, in a certain way. Another key challenge is 
discovering the appropriate mappings between two objects in the first place (e.g., Goldstone, 1994b; 
Taylor & Hummel, 2009). This is an aspect of the QP model of basic/analogical similarity that still needs 
to be developed. Perhaps some mechanism based on alignment of features (which could be easily 
implemented in the QP model) may provide a suitable way forward. Somewhat relatedly, we have not 
considered possible cognitive limitations as the rank of relevant tensors increases (which would happen 
if the compared objects increase in complexity; cf. Simon, 1955). This has been noted in an alternative 
approach to analogiĐal siŵilaƌitǇ ;aŶd ŵeŵoƌǇͿ ďased oŶ “ŵoleŶskǇ et al.͛s ;iŶ pƌessͿ ideas ;Wiles et al., 
1994). An interesting difference between the quantum tensor product approach and traditional ones is 
that, in the former, the overall required dimensionality can be moderated through the use of 
incompatible representations. For example, with three binary features, classically we need 2
3
 
dimensions. In a quantum model, if the features are incompatible, the needed dimensionality could be 
as low as two (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013; Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2011; cf. Emruli et al., 2013). 
Exploring more carefully the specific computational resources implied by different modeling approaches 
is an important priority for further work.  
 In sum, we think that the QP model of basic/analogical similarity is a promising model of 
analogical similarity. This encourages us in thinking that the QP principles may provide a firm foundation 
for understanding aspects of cognition including decision making, basic similarity, and analogical 
similarity.  
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